By
Mark Curtis
An
edited extract from Unpeople: Britain’s Secret Human
Right Abuses
The
formerly secret files on the Nigerian civil war in the late 1960s show very
clear British complicity in the Nigerian government’s aggression against the
region of Biafra, where an independence movement was struggling to secede from
Nigeria. This brutal civil war resulted in between one and three million
deaths; it also significantly helped shape modern Nigeria, and not least the
division of oil revenues between the central government and the regions and
people.
Background
to civil war
For
those in Britain old enough to remember the war in Nigeria in the late 1960s,
‘Biafra’ probably still conjures up images of starving children – the result of
the blockade imposed by the Nigerian government in Lagos to defeat the
secession of the eastern region, Biafra. For Biafrans themselves, the period
was one of immense suffering – it is still not known how many died at this time
as a direct result of the war and the blockade, but it is believed to be at
least one million and as high as three million.
For
those seeking to understand Britain’s role in the world, there is now an
important side of the Biafran story to add – British complicity in the
slaughter. The declassified files show that the then Wilson government backed
the Nigerian government all the way, arming its aggression and apologising for
its actions. It is one of the sorrier stories in British foreign policy, though
by no means unusual.
The
immediate background to the war was a complex one of tensions and violence
between Nigeria’s regions and ethnic groups, especially between those from the
east and the north. In January 1966 army officers had attempted to seize power
and the conspirators, most of whom were Ibos (from the East) assassinated
several leading political figures as well as officers of northern origin. Army
commander Major General Ironsi, also an Ibo, intervened to restore discipline
in the army, suspended the constitution, banned political parties, formed a
Federal Military Government (FMG) and appointed military governors to each of
Nigeria’s regions.
Ironsi’s
decree in March 1966, which abolished the Nigerian federation and unified the
federal and regional civil services, was perceived by many not as an effort to
establish a unitary government but as a plot by the Ibo to dominate Nigeria.
Troops of northern origin, who dominated the Nigerian infantry, became
increasingly restive and fighting broke out between them and Ibo soldiers in
garrisons in the south. In June, mobs in northern cities, aided by local
officials, carried out a pogrom against resident Ibos, massacring several
hundred people and destroying Ibo-owned property.
It
was in this context that in July 1966 northern officers staged a countercoup
during which Ironsi and other Ibo officers were killed. Lieutenant Colonel
(later General) Yakubu ‘Jack’ Gowon emerged as leader. The aim of the coup was
both to take revenge on the Ibos for the coup in January but also to promote
the secession of the north, although Gowon soon pulled back from calling
explicitly for this. Gowon named himself as the Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces and head of the military government, which was rejected by the military
governor in the eastern region, Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, who claimed, with
some justification, that the Gowon regime was illegitimate.
Throughout
late 1966 and 1967 the tempo of violence increased. In September 1966 attacks
on Ibos in the north were renewed with unprecedented ferocity, stirred up,
eastern region officials believed, by northern political leaders. Reports
circulated that troops from the northern region had participated in the
massacres. The estimated number of deaths ranged from 10,000 to as high as
30,000. More than one million Ibos returned to the eastern region in fear.
In
January 1967 the military leaders met in Aburi, Ghana. By this time the eastern
region under Ojukwu was threatening secession. Many of Ojukwu’s eastern
colleagues were now arguing that the massacres the previous September showed
that the country could not be reunited amicably. In a last minute effort at
Aburi to hold Nigeria together, an accord was agreed that provided for a loose
confederation of regions. Gowon issued a decree implementing the Aburi
agreement and even the northern region now favoured the formation of a
multistate federation. The federal civil service, however, vigorously opposed
the Aburi agreement and sought to scupper it.
Ojukwu
and Gowon then disputed what exactly had been agreed at Aburi, especially after
the Federal Military Government (FMG) issued a further decree in March which
was seen by Ojukwu as reneging on the FMG’s commitment at Aburi to give the
eastern region greater autonomy. The new decree gave the federal government the
right to declare a state of emergency in any region and to ensure that any
regional government could not undermine the executive authority of the federal
government. Ojukwu then gave an ultimatum to Gowon that the eastern region
would begin implementing its understanding of the Aburi agreement, providing
for greater regional autonomy, by 31 March.
While
Biafra was threatening to secede and declare an independent state, the FMG
imposed sanctions against it to bring it into line. On 26 May the eastern
region consultative assembly voted to secede from Nigeria and the following day
Gowon declared a state of emergency throughout the country, banned political
activity and announced a decree restoring full powers to the FMG. Also
announced was a decree dividing the country into twelve states, including six
in the north and three in the east.
On
30 May 1967 Biafra declared independence and on 7 July the FMG began operations
to defeat it. It lasted until January 1970 as an extremely well-equipped
Nigerian federal army of over 85,000 men supplied by Britain, the Soviet Union
and few others, took on a volunteer Biafran army, much of whose equipment
initially came from captured Nigerian supplies and which only later was able to
procure relatively small quantities of arms from outside.
The
background is therefore very complex and it remains far from clear cut as to
where the ‘blame’ lay for the failure of peaceful negotiations and the resort
to war. It does appear, however, that the FMG did go back on its agreement at
Aburi on the extent of regional autonomy it was prepared to offer the
easterners. Before they began to back the FMG unequivocally once war began,
British officials had previously recognised the legitimacy of some of Ojukwu’s
claims. The High British Commissioner in Lagos, Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce, had
told Gowon in November 1966, for example, that the September 1966 massacres of
the Ibos in the north ‘changed the relationship between the regions and made it
impossible for eastern Nigerians to associate with northerners on the same
basis as in the past’. The issue was one of basic ‘law and order and physical
safety throughout the federation’. He told Gowon that the FMG had to go ‘a
considerable distance to meet the views of Colonel Ojukwu’.
British
officials also recognised that the Aburi agreements were ‘extremely woolly on
many important points and lend themselves to infinite arguments over
interpretation’. By end January 1967 Cumming-Bruce was saying that both Gowon
and Ojuwku were ‘seriously at fault and they share responsibility for poisoning
of atmosphere [sic]‘.
Then
there was the wider question of whether it was legitimate for a region to
secede and whether Biafra should have been allowed to establish its
independence. Again, a lot of complex issues are involved. British officials
feared that if Biafra were to secede many other regions in Africa would too,
threatening ‘stability’ across the whole of the continent. Most of the great
powers, including the US and Soviet Union, shared this view largely for the
same reason.
Yet
there appears to be no reason why Biafra, with its 15 million people, could not
have established a viable, independent state. Biafrans argued that they were a
people with a distinctive language and culture, that they were Christian as
opposed to the Muslim communities lumped into the Nigeria federal state, which
had, after all, been a colonial creation. In fact, Biafra was also one of the
most developed regions in Africa with a high density of roads, schools,
hospitals and factories. The struggle for an independent state certainly
appeared to have the support of the majority of Biafrans, whose sense of
nationhood deepened throughout the war as enormous sacrifices were made to
contribute to the war effort.
What
is crystal clear is that the wishes of the Biafrans were never a major concern
of British planners; what they wanted, or what Nigerians elsewhere in the
federation wanted, was simply not an issue for Whitehall. There is simply no
reference in the government files, that I have seen, to this being a
consideration. The priorities for London were maintaining the unity of Nigeria
for geo-political interests and protecting British oil interests. This meant
that Gowon’s FMG was backed right from the start. But the files also reveal
astonishing levels of connivance with the FMG’s aggression.
To be continues
Published on
10/04/2014 13:47
Greenwich Mean Time
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